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In this paper we examine regulatory issues relating
to electronic money. The discussion proceeds along
three main lines. Firstly, the focus of attention on
the potential risks to the financial system is
typically on the systemic risk arising from the
payments system. Since issuers of electronic
money automatically become part of the payments
system, we consider if the arguments relating to
systemic risk originating in the payments system
apply in the case of electronic money. Secondly, we
examine the sharp divergence in regulatory
approaches between the US and the EU, and
suggest that a useful way of reconciling this
divergence is to note the existence of a  tradeoff
between the efficiency of the financial system and
the amount of risk assumed by the public sector.
This means that there is not necessarily a “correct”
answer to the question of the desirability of
regulation. Thirdly, technological advances and
financial innovations have made it easier for firms
to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Competitive
pressures may have encouraged financial centres
to engage in competitive deregulation, resulting in
a less than socially optimal level of regulation
overall. It is therefore important that national
authorities coordinate and harmonise their
regulatory policies.1
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the trend worldwide has been towards the
relaxation or removal of outmoded regulations and a focus on
financial market efficiency through greater competition.
Technological innovations in the financial markets have produced
services and products that pose challenges to financial market
regulators. A prime example of this is in the area of payments
services. There is little doubt that as part of the drive towards
greater efficiency the world is moving towards less cumbersome
media of exchange and more efficient means of transferring
money, and specifically towards the development of products
commonly referred to as “electronic money” or “digital money”.
At the same time, this drive must be tempered by the need to
maintain system integrity and soundness. At some stage a
tradeoff between system efficiency and riskiness will become
operative, and it is a matter of judgment whether we have
reached that stage.
In this paper we look at regulatory issues relating to electronic
money. Specifically, we consider whether the rationale for
financial regulation can or should be extended to electronic
money. A divergence of views between the US and the European
Union is immediately apparent, and we look into the implications
of this.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following
sections we will look at the question of regulation from both an
economics and a legal perspective. We begin by discussing the
two main types of electronic money in section 2. This provides the
context against which an overview of the economic case for the
regulation of financial markets may be given in section 3. The
economic rationale for financial regulation is based on a two-fold
argument, containing the threat of systemic risk and consumer2
protection. In section 4 we evaluate from a legal perspective the
“general business of banking”, an approach which is based on the
systemic risk argument, before moving on to consider more
explicitly issues relating to the regulation of electronic money in
section 5. Our concluding remarks are made in section 6.
2 ELECTRONIC MONEY
Electronic financial transaction systems have been distinguished
according to whether they involve the transfer of account
balances, incorporate electronic cheques, utilise secure value
counters, or are token-based.1 The first two are in essence systems
involving only electronically-communicated instructions about the
transfer or payment of funds. The latter two categories more
closely approximate what we might term ‘electronic money’,
which is the focus of our paper.
In general, two basic versions of electronic money systems may
be identified: general-purpose value stored on card-based media
(general-purpose stored-value cards, or  SVCs) and network
money. We discuss stored-value cards and network money in
turn.
2.1Stored-Value Cards
Stored-value cards ( SVCs), or pre-paid cards, are sometimes
referred to as ‘electronic purses’. Most commonly, stored-value
cards are used to provide secure counters of value which may be
progressively reduced in exchange for goods and services,
although there are systems in which the digital value stored on
the cards take the form of denominated tokens that are
transferable between system users. We focus our attention on
                                                
1  Furche and Wrightson (1996), at pp. 25-33.3
general-purpose cards whose stored value may be exchanged for
a wide range of goods and services, in contrast to more limited-
use cards such as telephone cards and travel cards. Obviously
there is no clear-cut demarcation line between these two extreme
cases. Instead, a spectrum of cards can be envisaged ranging from
single-purpose cards to general-purpose ones. The presence of
network externalities means that general-purpose cards are more
desirable from the point of view of users and that this is the
probable direction which will be taken in the evolution of this
particular payment method.2
The value balance stored in  SVCs is ‘spendable’ by the card
holder because the system incorporates previously agreed
arrangements between the card issuer and participating retailers.
This balance is evidence of the card holder’s entitlement to value
which has been purchased by a pre-payment to the card issuer. As
a result of previously agreed arrangements between the card
issuer and participating retailers, the latter agree to extend goods
or services in exchange for the transfer of an appropriate amount
of value from the cardholder’s card. The value data transferred
from the cardholder to the retailer in exchange for the
commodities provided is what will enable the retailer to claim
reimbursement from the card issuer. Reimbursement generally
involves the retailer  downloading or otherwise resubmitting to
the card issuer the value data received from the cardholder.
The balance on the card may be accessed, adjusted and
updated either on-line or off-line, but the latter is the preferred
option as it is cheaper. Off-line operations presently assume that
                                                
2  Stored-value cards may be incorporated as part o f what are
popularly known as “smart cards”, cards with an embedded
microchip capable of storing data not all of which is necessarily
financial in nature, such as medical records. However, it is not the
smart card per se which interests us, but that aspect of smart cards
which constitutes a form of payment medium, i.e., the stored-value
aspect of these cards.4
the hardware utilised (cards, terminals, wallets) is tamper-proof,
and that the risks implicit in off-line operations have been
reduced to an acceptably low level. Though transactions are often
inflexible in that they permit only transfers to a supplying retailer,
off-line systems may permit peer-to-peer transfers.
2.2 Network Money
We use the term ‘network money’ to refer to those electronic
impulses that are employed as value, and that may be stored on a
computer hard disk. Network money systems are software-based,
and envisage the exchange of electric impulses as the end, not
merely the means of a transaction. Although present protocols
incorporate single-use tokens and occasional or eventual
references to an issuing/validating financial institution, network
money transactions envisage the eventual exchange of value
without the need for such reference. Protocols incorporating
multiple-use tokens will thus permit peer-to-peer transactions.
The risk of double spending in these software-based systems is
controlled by the use of single-use tokens and on-line verification
of their currency. Transactions can be made anonymous for the
spender of the coin (the customer) by the use of ‘blinding’
technology. This enables the customer to scramble a self-
generated coin in such a way that its serial number is temporarily
obscured when the coin is submitted to the financial institution
for validation. The validated coin can subsequently be
unscrambled before being spent by the customer. Details of the
underlying sale transaction need not be included in the data
making up the token.
It is likely that network money will continue to evolve towards
multiple-use token-based systems. The portability and/or
(in)violability of the media upon which such value could be5
stored would, however, also raise many security issues3 as would
the possible location of substantial amounts of value outside
conventional financial domains.
3 ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING FINANCIAL
REGULATION
In this section we examine the economic arguments justifying
regulation in financial markets. Following Breyer and MacAvoy
(1987), we use the term ‘regulation’ to refer to governmental
actions, which are typically grounded in statute, to grant or
condition the rights of firms to provide goods and services in
particular areas of economic enterprise with the purpose of
preventing decisions by private agents that would take
insufficient account of the ‘public interest’.
There are two main categories of regulation arising from this
definition, both of which are based on the recognition that there
may exist factors which prevent the efficient pricing of goods and
services in the financial sector. Both rely on the presence of some
form of market failure which may necessitate governmental
intervention. The first category of regulation is designed to
address the presence of third-party, or  spillover, effects in the
form of systemic risk. The second is designed to protect the
interests of the consumers of financial products and services.4 The
discussion which follows is summarised in Figure 1.
                                                
3  Such as unauthorised duplication, multiple spending, and the
irrecoverable destruction of the storage media with value.
4  In the first case, the “ public interest” may be associated with
alleviating the problem of spillover effects; in the second case, it is
directly associated with the protection of consumers.6
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Figure 1: Official Intervention in Financial Markets
3.1 Systemic Risk
The most commonly identified externality in financial markets is
the spillover effect of the failure of a financial institution — by
which we refer to banks and other deposit-taking institutions —
on to the real economy. The exact nature of this externality,
commonly referred to as ‘systemic risk’, is not well understood,7
but it is the most potentially serious externality in financial
markets.
Systemic risk arising generally from the role and position in
the payments system of the financial institutions is of particular
concern to regulatory authorities. It is argued that maintaining the
integrity of the payments system provides a compelling reason for
the regulation of financial institutions.5 According to Borio and
Van den Bergh (1993):
Payment arrangements represent the connective tissue of all
financial and real economic activity, as it is the ability to settle
transactions, and confidence that the  counterparties will do
likewise, that underpins it. Inevitably, therefore, payments
arrangements can be a key channel for the transmission of shocks
across institutions and markets even when they are not the original
source.6
In general, payments system participants are exposed to two
types of risks: credit risks and liquidity risks.  Credit risk is
essentially the risk of loss on the outstanding claims on
participants in a transaction. The parties to a transaction will
generally include the counterparties to the transaction, the issuer
of the settlement medium (in other words, the payment
intermediary, typically a bank), and the delivery intermediaries,7
if any. Credit risk is realised when any of the participants accepts
a remittance of funds that the remitter does not possess ( i.e.,
defaults on their part of the contract).
                                                
5  See, for example, Hoenig (1997).
6  Borio and Van den Bergh (1993, pp. 31-32).
7  These are the intermediaries in charge of delivering the good being
bought and sold. For example, in the case of the sale and purchase
of financial securities, the delivery intermediary might be the
securities depository handling the exchange of title.8
Liquidity risk is the risk of the unavailability of the settlement
medium when it is due. Liquidity risk is realised when the
account of a participant in the transaction turns to deficit in the
short term, and when the participant’s plan for remaining liquid
fails and it cannot raise the needed funds to remain liquid at short
notice.
Borio and Van den  Bergh (1993) distinguish between credit
risk and liquidity risk as follows: credit risk refers to the
possibility of an actual loss, whereas liquidity risk refers to the
possibility of a cash-flow shortfall. Both types of risk can give rise
to a systemic crisis ( Oritani, 1991). A systemic crisis can be
brought about when the credit or liquidity risk involving only the
parties in a transaction spills over and affects other participants in
the payments system. For example, the failure of one financial
institution could trigger a run on other financial institutions
which are fundamentally sound financially. Similarly, chain
reaction effects can also arise from a single financial institution’s
liquidity crisis.
One description of how a systemic crisis could come about is
provided by O’Driscoll (1988):
The mechanism for this domino effect may be either direct or
indirect. It is direct if, for example, the failed bank served as a
correspondent bank for other banks, and their losses lead to their
insolvency. The mechanism is indirect if the first bank’s failure
causes fearful depositors to withdraw their funds from other
solvent but illiquid institutions. This ‘contagion’ effect involves a
classic banking panic, in which widespread depositor runs on
banks occur. In this case, the payments mechanism itself is
threatened. If a contagion effect exists, it would be a prime example
of the possible third-party effects of a bank failure.8
                                                
8  O’Driscoll (1988, pp. 661-662).9
In such an event, the effects of the collapse of an individual
financial institution would be multiplied many times over. In
either case, the business of banking is recognised as a form of
public good whose benefits are enjoyed by the community at
large; the failure of the banking system, it is argued, would have
effects far beyond those felt immediately within the
banking/financial industry.
There is another dimension to systemic risk which derives
from the ability of firms to conduct their business in different
jurisdictions, viz., cross-border  spillover effects. That is, a
systemic crisis originating in the payments system of a single
country could spark a chain reaction that spills over to
participants in payments systems in other parts of the world.
Two types of regulation are associated with attempts to
minimise the threat of a systemic crisis: arrangements to insure
the deposits of consumers of deposit-taking institutions or
otherwise compensate them for losses suffered in the event of
failure of a financial institution; and capital adequacy
requirements designed to minimise the risk of institutional
insolvency. In both cases, the need to alleviate the threat of a
systemic crisis is closely related to the protection of investors’
deposits.
The protection of consumers’ deposits gives rise to the well-
known moral hazard problem: if consumers’ deposits are insured
against loss, there is little incentive for them to require the
financial institutions to take proper precautions in their
investment activities, and little incentive for the financial
institutions to do so; as a result, the level of risk-taking by these
institutions will be higher than is socially optimal.10
The moral hazard problem in turn necessitates regulation in
the form of prudential constraints on their behaviour.9 These
typically take the form of capital adequacy requirements.
Prudential regulations in the form of capital adequacy
requirements, then, fulfil a three-fold function: they ensure a
minimum amount of capital to back up the liabilities of financial
institutions, providing a cushion in the event of institutional
failure; they provide investors with greater confidence in the
soundness of the financial institutions; and they alleviate the
moral hazard problem by forcing the financial institutions to
internalise to a greater extent than otherwise might be the case the
effects of their risk-taking activities.
Regulation, however, is not the only way of dealing with the
threat of a systemic crisis. The role of the central bank in
providing lender-of-last-resort facilities is recognised to be an
important way of reducing this threat. In addition, instead of an
explicit guarantee of consumers’ deposits in the form of a deposit
insurance scheme, there may be an implicit understanding that
the authorities will not allow the ‘larger’ financial institutions to
fail.
The mainstream view of financial regulation outlined above,
however, is by no means universally accepted within economics.
In particular, the free banking school rejects the need for any form
of financial regulation, arguing that there is nothing distinctive
about money that would justify making it an exception to the
general rule that free trade is best (see, for example, Dowd, 1996;
Selgin and White, 1994). An intermediate position is taken by
Benston and Kaufman (1995, 1996). With the free banking school,
they argue that there is little evidence that the financial system is
                                                
9  See Edwards and Mishkin (1995, pp. 40-41) for a discussion of how
capital adequacy requirements can ameliorate the moral hazard
problem while doing away with the need to restrict the activities of
the financial institutions.11
inherently unstable and subject to contagion effects and,
furthermore, that since firms in the financial sector are no
different from firms in any other industry, there is no justification
for consumer protection regulations. However, they argue in
favour of capital adequacy requirements to counter the moral
hazard problems arising from a government-funded deposit
insurance system, which they regard as an evil whose existence
must be dealt with.
On the other hand, as Dale (1996) notes, it is overwhelmingly
the case that the regulators of the major industrial countries
accept the reality of systemic risk. Indeed, while the issue remains
unsettled, the very possibility (however remote) of a contagion
effect in the financial sector can be argued to warrant regulatory
measures in the financial sector because of the huge potential
costs involved.
3.2 Consumer Protection
As outlined above, the threat of a systemic crisis arising from a
generalised panic run on financial institutions gives rise to a
perceived need to protect the deposits of consumers to alleviate
this threat. Financial markets are prone to another form of market
failure, viz., the inadequate supply of information relating to
financial products being offered to consumers. This form of
market failure may arise from the fact that the financial state of
affairs of financial institutions, with their networks of
interconnected financial ties and investments, is not readily
discernible to the average consumer; it may also arise from the
complicated nature of some financial products. In the case of
electronic money services, the problem is particularly acute. The
sophisticated state of the technology, the location of the industry
at the junction of economics, cryptography, law, and computer
technology, makes it particularly difficult for most people to12
grasp the entirety of the product being offered. In this area,
appropriate regulatory action may take the form of market
practice regulations (such as a requirement to provide
information about a product or service or laws against insider
trading) that are designed to ensure that consumers are treated
fairly. There is little dispute that such forms of regulation are
desirable.
In summary, the economic case for financial regulation has
traditionally rested on the need to contain systemic risk and on
the need for consumer protection. Furthermore, regulations aimed
at containing systemic risk tend to have an institutional or
prudential focus, such as those relating to financial institutions
and the prudential requirements applying to them; consumer
protection regulations, on the other hand, tend to have a product
focus aimed at setting standards of conduct in the markets for the
relevant products and services (Edey, 1996).
4 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING FINANCIAL
REGULATION
Jurisprudential theory recognises that the maintenance of social
order by means of rules and sanctions is a key function of the law.
The prevention of or control of activities capable of threatening
the financial system thus constitutes the meeting point for the
lawyer and the economist on the issue of financial regulation.
Economic theories and policies prompting the regulation of the
financial system are effected and enforced by means of legal rules
which of course are formulated in legal terms and subject to legal
interpretation. Policies based on economic formulae are often
supported and enforced directly or indirectly by means of legal
enactments, the words or tenor of which ideally reflect those
policies.13
In common law systems such as the Australian legal system,
the doctrine of the rule of law plays a fundamental role. This
requires inter alia that standards against which intended actions
may be compared must be provided by the law. Jurisprudence,
which is the philosophy of law, has long recognised that the
setting of standards is one of the fundamental functions of the
law; the rules of statutory interpretation also presume, for the
sake of the flexibility and responsiveness of the law, that
regulation may be extended to new risks or phenomena on the
basis of analogies, because the express mention of every possible
subject in advance is impossible.
This makes definitions and conceptual similarities very
significant to the common law lawyer — definitions are crucially
relied upon for the determination of the scope of a concept, and
the extension of regulation applicable to such a concept to a newer
concept is regarded as justified in certain circumstances. The
drawing of analogies between electronic money, and that which is
commonly regarded as money thus bears a particular significance
for the lawyer. To the lawyer, it is conceivable that arguments for
or against the extension of regulation or regulatory objectives may
derive in part from analogies drawn from their (dis)similarities. In
evaluating whether an activity or other phenomenon ought to be
made subject to regulation, the legal analyst will examine that
activity for similarities shared in common with other activities
already the subject of regulation. Novel features not possessed by
already regulated activities will also be of interest as they may
argue for or against the extension of regulation to that activity.
Where financial regulation is concerned, attention is focused
on the scope of the ‘general business of banking’. The
categorisation of an activity as falling within this description has
legal consequences: for example, the carrying on of the business of
banking by an unlicensed entity is typically an offence or, where14
authorised, is accompanied by extensive regulation.10 The
rationale derives from the economic concept of systemic risk,
particularly contagion risk, which was discussed in the previous
section. It is a widely-held belief that contagion risk is highest
among deposit-taking institutions like banks.11
The scope of the general business of banking varies according
to jurisdiction. In Australia, the concept is given a relatively
narrow scope: thus, the taking of deposits, the lending of money,
and the repayment of money are restricted activities.  The
operation of current accounts and cheque accounts have tended to
be regarded as merely incidental means by which the core
functions might be accomplished12 — the taking of deposits rather
than the operation of particular accounts has thus been regarded
as central. This conception of the general business of banking is
broader in Europe. In England, for example, the Australian
conception was considered dated and the banking functions of
collecting cheques for customers, paying of cheques drawn on the
                                                
10  A distinction is made in Australia between ‘the general business of
banking’ which is restricted to banks, and ‘banking business’ which
may be permitted to non-banks with permission. An individual
(incorporated or unincorporated) wishing to carry on ‘banking
business’ may thus be exempted from most banking regulations
while being allowed to conduct limited banking functions. Financial
institutions involved in the provision of payment services typically
obtain exemptions where the applicable legislation permits. See, for
example, ss.8, 11 Banking Act 1959 (Australia).
11 See, for example, Financial System Inquiry (1996, p. 96).
12 See  Commissioners of the State Savings Bank of Victoria v
Permewan,  Writh & Co Ltd  (1914) 19 CLR 457, where the
Australian High Court determined the essential features of banking
business to be the taking of deposits, the advantageous use of such
deposited funds, and the repayment of those funds as and when
agreed with the depositor. This definition was affirmed fifty years
later in Australian Independent Distributors Ltd v Winter (1964) 112
CLR 443 despite the adoption of a broader concept in other
jurisdictions such as England.15
bank itself, and operating current accounts, treated as
fundamental.13 In Germany, the business of banking is defined
under statute to include deposit taking, lending business, and
guarantee business, among others.14
The question of what is or ought to be exclusive banking
business is a politically sensitive issue that may be influenced by
policy, competition concerns, or consumer protection concerns, to
name a few. Because the definitive section of the German Banking
Act had been interpreted in such a way that stored value cards
might be excluded, regulators, anxious to secure and maintain
central bank control over the emerging technology, added new
sections which specifically include the issue of prepaid cards and
network money within its ambit.15 In Australia, in contrast, the
issue of stored value by entities other than licensed Deposit
Taking Institutions has not been prohibited, although it has been
indicated that such entities may be required to hold collateral
against unsettled claims or meet other requirements deemed
necessary in open systems.16 Policy statements made by US
regulators revealing that prepaid cards will probably not be
regarded as deposits for the purposes of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act save in limited circumstances17 reflect the desire of
regulators there to avoid the disruption of the development of the
technology.
                                                
13 See United Dominions Trust Ltd v Kirkwood [1966] 2 QB 431.
14  See s.1 of the German Banking Act.
15  See Friederich (1997) at pp.12-15.
16  See Financial System Inquiry (1997, pp.402-404).
17  See Smith and Wilson (1997, p.1116, 1117) quoting FDIC General
Counsel’s Opinion No.8, Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed Reg. 40,490
(1996), which considers the case of funds held by insured
depository institutions, and concluding that stored-value cards will
be regarded as deposits where the funds remain in the consumer’s
account until a vendor demands payment, but not, for instance,
where the funds are held temporarily for a third party, or received or
held by a third party.16
A closed electronic purse system is one where the card issuer,
directly or indirectly, provides all commodities purchasable by
means of card. Although the line of demarcation is not presently
fixed, it may be said that a system is open where the card issuer is
distinct and independent from the provider(s) of commodities
which may be purchased by means of the card. Irrespective of
whether a system is regarded as involving the taking of deposits
or not, it may be that its arrangement as an open system triggers
regulatory measures. The scrutiny and compliance burdens
associated with such regulation may mean that banks or financial
institutions alone will be permitted to issue value, with the
participation of nonbank financial institution (NBFI) developers
being limited to system establishment, development and
maintenance. Regulator attitudes to this issue have been
discussed above.
5 THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MONEY
From the foregoing, it seems clear that some minimum level of
regulation of electronic money is required. The question is, what
form should the regulation take, and when should it be applied?
While consumer protection concerns provide reasonably clear
answers to these questions, we can offer no definitive answers
from the systemic risk perspective. Nonetheless we are able to
make some observations that may serve to guide the way the
questions are approached.
As a preliminary to our discussion, we note that clarity with
regard to the legal rights and obligations of participants in the
new payments services is a prerequisite here, as in all other
markets, for the efficient development of the market. The relative
novelty of electronic stored value products and payments services
raises concerns that there may be uncertainty about the legal
rights and obligations of participants in these products, and about17
the enforceability of contracts surrounding them.18 As  Borio and
Van den Bergh (1993) note in the context of the payments system
generally:
The lack of clarity in the legal framework can be a source of risk in
its own right to the extent that it creates uncertainty about, or leads
to incorrect perceptions of, exposures to potential losses… As a
result, the actual risks run could be significantly higher than
assumed.
It may be the case that the market itself will evolve some
convention allocating these rights and obligations among its
participants, or it may be that the government will have to take a
more active role in the process. However, the actual allocation of
legal rights and obligations is not as important as the fact that
some unambiguous allocation is made ( Coase, 1960). This
allocation of rights and obligations does not fall within our
definition of regulatory action since, by and large, there are no
resulting third-party effects. We take it as given that a clear
allocation of rights will be achieved. At the same time, the manner
in which disputes between participants in the new payments
technology are resolved will shape the way electronic payments
and money will evolve. To the extent that regulatory imperatives
are conditioned by the latter, we will need to take the allocation of
rights and obligations between parties into account.
On the question of the regulation of electronic money, we note
that issuers of electronic money automatically become part of the
payments system regardless of their status as banking institutions
or otherwise. Therefore we will have to consider if the arguments
relating to systemic risk originating in the payments system apply
in the case of electronic money. If so, we will also have to take into
account the added dimension of cross-border spillover effects.
                                                
18  Patrikis (1997) discusses, inter alia, some of these issues.18
Our judgment is that at the current stage of development and
usage of electronic money products, payments risk is likely to be
minimal because the medium is used at the retail rather than
wholesale level. This is likely to continue to be the case in the
foreseeable future. The implications are two-fold. First, the
absolute size of total payments involved will be small compared,
for example, to the amounts involved in  interbank wholesale
transfers. Second, as currently used, electronic money media
predominantly take the form of  prepaid value and hence all
payments are ultimately fully backed by deposits.19 Both these
situations could change, of course, but this simply means that
developments in electronic money, as in financial markets
generally, will have to be continually monitored.
However, if the use of electronic money becomes widespread,
the failure of a large electronic money issuer or of its system could
seriously jeopardise the payments system. The failure of any
participant in the payments system, as noted earlier, could have a
disruptive impact on the economy, depending on the size of the
participant and its credit and payments system links. The impact
of the failure of an issuer of electronic money would depend not
just on its size but also on the degree to which the use of
electronic money had become entrenched in the spending habits
of consumers.
In addition, if the integrity of electronic money systems comes
under threat, the effect could be catastrophic. Electronic money
may be inherently more subject to fraud and counterfeiting than
traditional forms of money. Friederich (1997) notes that:
                                                
19  Solomon (1991) makes a similar point: “Payments risk may be one
[example of a negative externality] but this seems less of a problem
at retail rather than wholesale since money cashing is backed by
deposits; we do not see any potential ‘unwind’ situation or systemic
risk… The situation at retail is unlikely to lead to any rapid-fire
payments shocks.” (at p. 180)19
[The integrity of] e-money systems … is primarily a product of the
resilience to counterfeiting, the security and the reliability of the
technology employed as well as the creditworthiness and liquidity
of the issuers. Whereas the latter can be adequately covered by
general banking supervision — assuming that the issuers are banks
— assessing the risks of counterfeiting and the systems’ technical
and organisational stability poses a new challenge to central banks.
He goes on to paint a nightmare scenario in which electronic
money issuers could be faced with failure, with serious
ramifications:
[I]n the event of massive forgeries, the issuer will find himself
facing claims which he cannot dismiss because he has no way of
differentiating between forgeries and genuine units of value. Once
e-money products are then no longer accepted, the distribution of
products and services via vending machines and similar equipment
as well as retail sales would come to a halt. Owing to the preceding
substitution of e-money for cash, it is possible that insufficient
banknotes and coins might be available at short notice.20
At the same time, the need for security in electronic money
products is widely recognised to be a crucial aspect of these
products if they are to gain wide acceptability among the retail
public. A task force on the security of electronic money
established by the central banks of the G-10 countries into the
security of electronic money recently declared itself “impressed
with the amount of research that has been undertaken and
resources that have been expended on the security of electronic
money products.”21 However, while it concluded that the security
measures that have been developed so far “should provide a high
degree of security for electronic money products in their initial
                                                
20  Friederich (1997, p. 10).
21  Bank for International Settlements (1996, p. 26).20
stages” it implicitly acknowledged the need for ongoing research
“as the resources and capabilities available to both suppliers and
potential attackers of these systems increase”.22 The problem of
fraud and counterfeiting, however, is not one whose solution is to
be found in regulation. 23 We merely note its existence and pass on.
There has been much debate over the question of whether
issuers of electronic money should be required to have the status
of banks. To do so would bring electronic money issuers under
the regulatory oversight of the banking authorities. A sharp
divergence of approach on this issue is immediately apparent in
the official positions taken by the European Union and the United
States. The close analogies drawn between the activities of the
issuers of stored value cards and deposit taking under the laws of
some member states of the European Union led to the
recommendation in a 1994 report to the European Monetary
Institute that only banks should be allowed to issue multi-
purpose prepaid cards (Working Group on EU Payment Systems,
1994). The Report notes that every such card scheme by definition
involves the taking of deposits by the issuer, and that therefore
the right to issue electronic purses should be restricted to banks in
order, inter  alia, to protect the integrity of the retail payments
system and to protect consumers against the consequences of the
                                                
22  Bank for International Settlements, op. cit., p. 26.
23  That is to say, it is a problem best addressed by individual operators
and providers, perhaps working cooperatively to develop and agree
on a standardised set of protocols, by ensuring that security
safeguards are built into their systems. As an official of the U.S.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency states: “Our stored-value
guidance … emphasizes that transactions must be secure, but it
does not specify particular security measures that must be taken”
(Kamihachi, 1997). In addition, ceilings on the amounts that can be
held on electronic money storage devices can help limit the
potential losses suffered by users. This may well be a measure that
will be taken by providers without the need for regulation, in order to
enhance the attractiveness of their product.21
failure of the issuers. This recommendation is to be extended to
include network money.24
By contrast, US officials have adopted a wait-and-see
approach,25 wary of introducing regulations that might stifle
innovation in the market.26 A selection of quotations will suffice to
illustrate this point:
On behalf of the entire Board, I want to state clearly at the outset
that the Federal Reserve has not the slightest desire to inhibit the
evolution of this emerging industry by regulation, nor to constrain
its growth. On the contrary, the Board has and will continue to
encourage innovations in payments technologies that benefit
consumers and businesses.27
The development of electronic money clearly gives rise to
important and legitimate areas of government concern… At the
same time, government must be ever mindful not to unnecessarily
impede free market developments.28
As financial systems become more complex, detailed rules and
standards have become both burdensome and ineffective, if not
counterproductive. If we wish to foster financial innovation, we
must be careful not to impose rules that inhibit it. I am especially
                                                
24  Friederich (1997, at p. 14) has declared that “network money
systems … are to be subject to the full set of banking supervision
requirements.”
25  Kamihachi (1997) provides an illuminating account of the approach
taken by a U.S. supervisory authority in offering guidance to
providers and in monitoring developments in the market.
26  The Reserve Bank of New  Zealand also appears to have taken a
similar stance. See Ledingham (1996).
27  Blinder (1995).
28  Ludwig (1995).22
concerned that we do not attempt to impede unduly our newest
innovation, electronic money.29
One way of resolving the apparent conflict between the US
and the EU approaches is to recognise that there is a  tradeoff
between the efficiency of the financial system and the amount of
risk assumed by the public sector.30 To the extent that regulatory
differences between countries exist at any point in time, they will
reflect national perceptions and judgments regarding risk and
efficiency, and national preferences on the risk-efficiency
spectrum at that particular time.31 This means that there is not
necessarily a ‘correct’ answer to the question of the appropriate
degree of regulation. Furthermore, the question of timing is
relevant. While current dollar amounts of payments being settled
by means of electronic money are ‘small’32 and hence the effects of
any disruptions arising from them are unlikely to pose a systemic
threat, if the use of electronic money becomes widespread, it is
likely that the US authorities may at some point decide that a
greater degree of regulatory action is appropriate.33
  Another issue of relevance to electronic money is the fact that
technological advances and financial innovations in recent years
have made it much easier for firms to engage in regulatory
arbitrage: if financial regulation is too restrictive in one
jurisdiction, both providers and users of financial services can
simply move to a less restrictive (and less costly) jurisdiction.
                                                
29  Greenspan (1996).
30  See Folkerts-Landau (1990) and Simpson (1991) on this point.
31 Some authors also draw attention to institutional factors. See
Folkerts-Landau (1990) and  Lelieveldt (1997). Indeed, the
institutional structure of a country’s financial system may well be a
factor in the way risk and efficiency are regarded.
32  Gilbert (1996).
33  See Gilbert (1996).23
There are a number of issues pertaining to this. First, although
some degree of regulatory protection is valued by firms,
competitive pressures may have resulted in financial centres
engaging in competitive deregulation ( Folkerts-Landau, 1990).
The existence of a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation leads to the
possibility that the outcome could be a “lowest-common-
denominator” approach to financial regulation as authorities
compete to have firms locate within their jurisdictions, resulting
in a less than socially optimal level of regulation overall.
Second, regulatory arbitrage means that it is often possible for
firms located both within and without a relatively strict
jurisdiction to manoeuvre around regulations by using the
services of financial institutions located in more lax jurisdictions,
thereby undermining the intentions of the authorities in the
stricter jurisdiction. There is also the possibility of illegal activities
in lax jurisdictions spilling over into stricter ones. As Herring &
Litan (1995, p. 6) observe, “[a]nother way in which countries can
suffer from unwelcome financial  spillovers is through money-
laundering activities that facilitate criminal enterprise. Countries
that permit such activities reduce the costs of criminal enterprise
that can affect or be conducted within other countries”.
Third, it has been argued that the EU restrictions on the issue
of prepaid cards to banks, particularly if extended to apply also to
network money, will place European developers of electronic
money at a competitive disadvantage  vis-a-vis US ones ( Grigg,
1997). The official European response34 to these concerns is
essentially to reject the argument that technical innovation will be
impaired on the grounds that the restriction to banks concerns
only the  issue of electronic money, whereas the continuing
technical research and development is not similarly restricted to
                                                
34  As expressed, for example, by van der  Wielen (1997) and
Friederich (1997).24
banks. There is nothing which prevents a partnership between
system operators and banks. Furthermore, they point out that
there is nothing to prevent a system operator from applying for a
banking licence.
The first two (and possibly the third) of these issues point to a
clear need for the harmonisation or coordination of regulatory
policies. In this regard, national authorities will have to find a
balance between national autonomy and coordination with other
regulatory authorities. Since the economic case for international
policy coordination is based on the presence of cross-border
spillover effects,35 this fact could be used as a point of reference in
determining the boundaries of coordination efforts on regulation.
Herring and  Litan (1995), in fact, have argued that measures
aimed at consumer protection rather than systemic stability
should be directed by national preferences, while international
coordination efforts should be directed towards issues of global
systemic significance.
This raises the question of whether the regulatory framework
should be focused on the organisation of markets rather than
institutions (Herring and  Litan, 1995; Financial System Inquiry,
1996). Consumer protection regulations are primarily product- or
market-focused, while systemic stability regulations tend to be
institution-focused (Edey, 1996). The latter follows directly from
the nature of systemic risk, which is understood to be triggered by
institutional insolvency. However, one of the features of financial
markets today is the increasing blurring of distinctions between
different types of financial institutions, and even between
financial institutions and firms that are not primarily associated
with financial products and services. In this regard, the rapidly
evolving nature of electronic money products may mean that
                                                
35  See, for example, Oudiz and Sachs (1984), Branson  et al. (1990),
and Currie (1990).25
regulations that are too narrowly focused on the features of
existing products will be rendered obsolete very quickly. The
issue of product focus versus institution focus is a complex one,
however, and we will not pursue it further in this paper.
6 SUMMARY
We conclude by summarising the key points of our paper.
Maintaining the soundness of the financial system is a matter of
concern to both economists and lawyers although they may
approach questions regarding regulation from slightly different
perspectives. The lawyer may seek answers through an
examination of the justification of the extension of relevant
concepts (such as the business of banking). Conclusions that the
issue of electronic money involves the taking of deposits may
seem to justify some regulation, but there is a need for caution
against the imposition of undue control and in the drawing of
comparisons between concepts.
From an economist’s viewpoint, the focus of attention on the
potential risks to the financial system has typically been on the
systemic risk arising from the payments system. The first
observation to be made is that issuers of electronic money
automatically become part of the payments system regardless of
their status as banking institutions or otherwise. Therefore we
will have to consider if the arguments relating to systemic risk
originating in the payments system apply in the case of electronic
money. If so, we will also have to take into account the added
dimension of cross-border spillover effects. We conclude that at
the current stage of development and usage of electronic money
products, payments risk is likely to be minimal because the
medium is used at the retail rather than wholesale level.
However, if the use of electronic money becomes widespread, the
failure of a large electronic money issuer or of its system would26
seriously jeopardise the payments system. Concerns about
systemic risk would then come significantly into play. In addition,
systemic risk originating in one part of a domestic financial
system could easily spread to other financial centres because of
the international nature of electronic money. This international
dimension to systemic risk should be taken account of explicitly
in considering the need for regulation and the form that
regulation should take.
  Second, we note that a sharp divergence in regulatory
approaches between the US and the EU is immediately apparent
to even the casual observer. A useful way of reconciling this
divergence is to note the existence of a  tradeoff between the
efficiency of the financial system and the amount of risk assumed
by the public sector. To the extent that regulatory differences
between countries exist, they will reflect national perceptions and
judgments regarding risk and efficiency, and national preferences
on the risk-efficiency spectrum. This in turn will determine the
content and weight accorded policy considerations. This means
that there is not necessarily a ‘correct’ answer to the question of
the desirability of regulation. The issue of the appropriate timing
of regulatory action is also relevant.
  Third, technological advances and financial innovations in
recent years have made it much easier for firms to engage in
regulatory arbitrage: if financial regulation is too restrictive in one
jurisdiction, both providers and users of financial services can
simply move to a less restrictive (and less costly) jurisdiction.
Although some degree of regulatory protection is valued by
firms, competitive pressures may have resulted in financial
centres engaging in competitive deregulation. This could lead to a
‘lowest-common-denominator’ approach to financial regulation as
authorities compete to have firms locate within their jurisdictions,
resulting in a less than socially optimal level of regulation overall.27
  There are important implications for both the domestic and
international financial systems. These include the following: (1)
firms engaging in regulatory arbitrage means that it is important
for different national authorities to coordinate and harmonise
their regulatory policies, in order to avoid not just the risks
inherent in competitive deregulation, but also the danger of lax
rules in one country having an adverse effect on the ability of
other countries to enforce financial regulations and to deal with
fraudulent transactions; furthermore, to the extent that regulatory
laxity represents a higher level of risk, the possibility of systemic
spillover effects on other, more conservatively regulated,
jurisdictions is something that needs to be taken into account; (2)
to the extent that differences between Europe and the US persist,
this may confer a competitive advantage to US firms which are
able to innovate more quickly and move their operations into
Europe; if they do this rapidly enough and are able to penetrate
the European market sufficiently, the European firms may never
catch up. This has obvious implications for industry policy.
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